Blockchain Security Researcher
Current๐ง๐ต๐๐ป๐ฑ๐ฒ๐ฟ๐๐ผ๐ฎ๐ป ๐ฆ๐บ๐ฎ๐ฟ๐ ๐๐ผ๐ป๐๐ฟ๐ฎ๐ฐ๐ ๐๐๐ฑ๐ถ๐:I Conducted an in-depth audit of ThunderLoan, a decentralized Lending protocol, focusing on its flash loan functionality, oracle mechanisms and upgradeability patterns. Key findings included:I. Storage Collision : Found that mixing up variable locations in ThunderLoan and its upgrade caused a conflict between the two different storage variable, leading to incorrect fee calculation.II. Price Manipulation Risk: Found that relying on a decentralized exchange protocol as a price oracle, exposes the system to manipulation attacks where malicious users can easily bypass protocol fees, thereby significantly reducing the fees earned by the liquidity providers.III. Erroneous Exchange Rate Calculation: Identified a high-severity issue where the ThunderLoan::UpdateExchangeRate function, triggered during deposits, erroneously inflated the protocol's perceived fee accrual. As a result, users were prevented from redeeming their collateral,In total, I identified 2 high, 2 medium and 1 low-severity vulnerabilities, providing detailed recommendations that enhanced the security and reliability of the protocol๐๐ผ๐๐ ๐๐ฟ๐ถ๐ฑ๐ด๐ฒ ๐ฆ๐บ๐ฎ๐ฟ๐ ๐๐ผ๐ป๐๐ฟ๐ฎ๐ฐ๐ ๐๐๐ฑ๐ถ๐I Conducted an in-depth audit of the Boss Bridge protocol, a bridging mechanism designed to transfer the Boss Bridge Token(BBT) from layer 1 (L1) to Layer 2 (L2) . Key findings included:I. Token Approval Vulnerability: Identified a critical vulnerability in the depositTokensToL2 function, which allows any caller to specify a from address for token transfers. This oversight enables attackers to withdraw tokens from any user who was granted the bridge token allowance.II. Lack of Replay Protection in withdrawals: Identified a critical vulnerability in the withdrawTokenToL1 function, which allows attackers to exploit the absence of replay protection in withdrawal signatures.In total, I identified 4 high, 1 medium and 1 low-severity .
