Conceived, created, developed, and executed from scratch a 7-10 week in house Unconventional Resource Play Boot Camp training program for new graduate engineers, geoscientists, and landmen to teach resource play principles and fundamentals.• Premise: New engineering and geosciences graduates are woefully unprepared for North American Resource Plays.• Technical Curriculum: petroleum geology, hydrocarbon systems, geochemistry, geophysics, geomechanics, petrophysics, log correlation… Show more Conceived, created, developed, and executed from scratch a 7-10 week in house Unconventional Resource Play Boot Camp training program for new graduate engineers, geoscientists, and landmen to teach resource play principles and fundamentals.• Premise: New engineering and geosciences graduates are woefully unprepared for North American Resource Plays.• Technical Curriculum: petroleum geology, hydrocarbon systems, geochemistry, geophysics, geomechanics, petrophysics, log correlation, cross-section creation, subsurface mapping, geologic out-crop field trip, hydraulic fracturing, water management, micro/nano darcy reservoir fluid mechanics, artificial lift, well design, basic oilfield chemistry, clays, engineering economics, rate transient analysis.• Nontechnical Curriculum: HSE; ethics; critical thinking, reasoning and analysis; "real world" and Fermi problems; public perception and social license to operate; land; permitting; and personal soft skills.• Stressed importance and necessity of multidisciplinary teams as well as multidisciplinary engineers and geoscientists. • Dinners with the CEO, COO, CFO, and other members of the Senior Management Team were an integral part of the program. Highlights of the dinners were hearing corporate expectations directly from those setting the expectations, their often convoluted career paths, and the “when I was a young ……” stories. • The program is evergreen, adjusting to company and industry resource play learnings, company needs, as well as the collective complexion/personality of each subsequent new graduate class. Weekly “The Good, The Bad, and The Ugly” feedback sessions augmented the continuous improvements and customizations. No two classes have been exactly the same. • Graduate new hires now move significantly up the resource play multidiscipline learning curve and into fulltime operational roles in ≈12 months. Prior ad hoc training was ≈3+ years to develop a similar skill set. Show less

Tasked to determine causes of, and solutions to, numerous drilling issues and challenges in multiple basins: Val Verde, Maverick, Williston, Uinta, Anadarko.Uinta Basin – 2013-14 Uteland Butte / Wasatch wells, drilled and cased for 5-12 MM$, were uneconomic at $90/bbl oil. Tasked to design and consistently execute an economic well at $50/bbl oil.• Multiple drilling issues: enlarged shallow hole, bridges, fill, lost circulation, tight hole and stuck pipe in the Trona formation, a… Show more Tasked to determine causes of, and solutions to, numerous drilling issues and challenges in multiple basins: Val Verde, Maverick, Williston, Uinta, Anadarko.Uinta Basin – 2013-14 Uteland Butte / Wasatch wells, drilled and cased for 5-12 MM$, were uneconomic at $90/bbl oil. Tasked to design and consistently execute an economic well at $50/bbl oil.• Multiple drilling issues: enlarged shallow hole, bridges, fill, lost circulation, tight hole and stuck pipe in the Trona formation, a “geomechanically unstable” shale present at ≈74° inclination prevented setting 9 5/8” casing through the curve, OBM contamination from waxy formation crude, and low lateral ROPs.• Determined from seismic surface casing was set in unconsolidated alluvium fill. Debris rain from the alluvium fill caused the enlarged hole, bridges, fill, lost circulation, and the misdiagnosis of the “geomechanically unstable” shale. Setting surface casing below the alluvium fill eliminated these issues. • Discovered, through literature research, the Trona is a sodium carbonate/bicarbonate formation, soluble in water, with a basal salt. Salt creep caused the tight hole and stuck pipe. Adoption of Williston Basin salt drilling practices eliminated these incidents• Downsizing the casing program and setting 7" through the curve, allowed the lateral to be drilled with brine, eliminating 500 k$ of contaminated OBM, increasing ROP and reducing lateral days from 14 to 4. • Delivered first well for 3.5 MM$, and consistently delivered next 33+ wells for 2.8 MM$, saving 80 – 330 MM$ of capital over a 3 years, making 10s of millions of barrels of reserves economic. Williston Basin – 1 of 4 wells had a “premature liner hanger partial set”, preventing packers/sleeves from reaching TD.• Each occurrence lost an average of 4 stages, 33 mbo, and 2.1 MM$ PV10. Improper mixing of salt gel mud caps caused barite sag and dirty hole. Revised mixing and placement procedures; liners have consistently run to bottom on 60+ wells. Show less

Texas Railroad Commission Statewide Rule 13 Revision – 2013• Identified 26 items in proposed rule changes that were detrimental to the industry. Requested and obtained an audience with the Railroad Commissioners to discuss the 26 items. The RRC agreed to amend/change/eliminate 20 of the 26 items.• Most critical was revising the Mechanical Integrity Test requirements to allow, rather than prevent, the use of toe-sleeves. Another was to eliminate the undesirable 2"-3" minimum casing-hole… Show more Texas Railroad Commission Statewide Rule 13 Revision – 2013• Identified 26 items in proposed rule changes that were detrimental to the industry. Requested and obtained an audience with the Railroad Commissioners to discuss the 26 items. The RRC agreed to amend/change/eliminate 20 of the 26 items.• Most critical was revising the Mechanical Integrity Test requirements to allow, rather than prevent, the use of toe-sleeves. Another was to eliminate the undesirable 2"-3" minimum casing-hole annular clearance requirement. BLM Proposed Nation Wide Frac Rules – 2015• Provided technical support through API, WEA, and other industry trade groups that ultimately led to overturning the BLM proposed rules in federal court. BLM Santa Fe Regional Office: Instruction Memorandum No. NM-2017-008 -- 2017• The Carlsbad Field Office interpreted Onshore Order 2 such that the annular RWP must match the BOP ram RWP when the MASP is ≥ 5,000 psi.Member of an Industry Delegation to demonstrate that the Carlsbad FO interpretation was not aligned with API Standard 53, BESSE Regulations, and well control professionals; that a only a limited number 10M annulars were available for rental or purchase; and that 10M annulars presented an increased risk of injury to personnel during nipple-up operations. Ultimately the BLM rejected the delegation’s arguments, but did grant a waiver process. Show less

Louisiana-Texas Gulf Coast, South Texas, and Val Verde Basin (1999 – 2011)• Vertical, directional, horizontal; WBM, OBM, air; Deep, HPHT, depleted; Pressure prediction & detection; Well control; Coring; Rig selection/contracts; Turnkey contracts; Location selection/construction; Directional program; Casing design; Mud, cement programs; Detailed drilling prognoses. Gulf of Mexico Shelf (1995 – 2004)• Jackup, platform, snubbing unit; Vertical, directional, horizontal; WBM, OBM;… Show more Louisiana-Texas Gulf Coast, South Texas, and Val Verde Basin (1999 – 2011)• Vertical, directional, horizontal; WBM, OBM, air; Deep, HPHT, depleted; Pressure prediction & detection; Well control; Coring; Rig selection/contracts; Turnkey contracts; Location selection/construction; Directional program; Casing design; Mud, cement programs; Detailed drilling prognoses. Gulf of Mexico Shelf (1995 – 2004)• Jackup, platform, snubbing unit; Vertical, directional, horizontal; WBM, OBM; HPHT, depletion; Pressure prediction/detection; Well control; OH/CH logging; Cased hole sidetracks; Stacked gravel packs; Rig selection/contracts; Turnkey contracts; Casing design; Mud, cement programs; Detailed drilling prognosis. Show less

Gulf of Mexico ShelfExploration, development; Acquisitions, dispositions; Lease sale, Budget, EOY reserves; Farm in/out, unitization, OBO; Formation evaluation, Volumetrics, Decline curve and Nodal analysis, Engineering economics. • Eugene Island 251/262 – 220 BCF + 2.5 MMBC Discovery • Provided engineering analyses that supported the geologic interpretation, reducing the risk of an off-structure down-dip exploration prospect. 3-D seismic suggested a large gas reservoir with a ≈… Show more Gulf of Mexico ShelfExploration, development; Acquisitions, dispositions; Lease sale, Budget, EOY reserves; Farm in/out, unitization, OBO; Formation evaluation, Volumetrics, Decline curve and Nodal analysis, Engineering economics. • Eugene Island 251/262 – 220 BCF + 2.5 MMBC Discovery • Provided engineering analyses that supported the geologic interpretation, reducing the risk of an off-structure down-dip exploration prospect. 3-D seismic suggested a large gas reservoir with a ≈ 2,000’ column length, but with less than ideal trapping conditions. The P/Z of a small abnormally pressured 8 BCF up-dip fault block exhibited distinct signs of restricted pressure support not characteristic of water encroachment. Reasoning that the down-dip limit of the amplitude was normally pressured, and then applying a reservoir gas gradient to the amplitude column, the up-dip amplitude reservoir matched the initial reservoir pressure of the small fault block. Newfield successfully acquired the leases from Exxon, drilled an off-structure discovery, and developed a previously unrecognized 220 BCF reservoir.• Ship Shoal 157 – 7.5 MMBO + 20 BCF Discovery • At first glance, the discovery well log appeared to be gas on water. Further petrophysical analysis strongly suggested the water signature was false, most likely a result of smaller formation grain size. Specifically targeted this FTL (funny looking thing) with sidewall cores confirming the false water signature. Along with the geologist, recommend drilling down-dip, leading to the discovery of a 7.5 MMBO reservoir.• Ship Shoal 145 – 20 BCF Acquisition • Block was add-on baggage, to another acquisition. Seller valued block at slightly <2 BCF, barely sufficient to cover abandonment expenses. Decline curve analysis, coupled with P/Z of the sole producing well indicated a 20 BCF reservoir, matching spill point volumetrics. Newfield accepted the “baggage” and produced the 20 BCF, more than paying for the entire acquisition Show less